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PRACTICING LAW AND DOING
BUSINESS IN THE SOVIET UNION
RICHARD N. DEAN *
Coudert Brothers first began considering the possibility of opening an
office in the Soviet Union in early 1987. In January 1987 the Soviets
adopted the Joint Venture Law, which, for the first time since the 1920s,
created a legal basis for foreign investment in the Soviet Union.' There
was a belief at that time that commercial transactions in East-West trade
would become more complex than they had been before.
I will offer a different kind of approach to some of the issues that
Ambassador Gardner has so effectively discussed. My approach to
explain what is going on in the Soviet Union is very. inductive. Some-
times I feel overwhelmed when I contemplate the barriers with which we
are confronted in trying to create an environment in which we can deliver
high-quality legal services to our clients. My approach in making these
remarks is to draw some conclusions from some very concrete experiences
that we have had in Moscow since February 1988. I will start by
explaining why and how we decided to start a Soviet practice and open a
Moscow office and then discuss some of the ways in which our practice
has developed in order to give you an idea of how it has paralleled some
developments that the Ambassador and the other speakers have pointed
out.
As an aside, most of the legal practice in East-West trade prior to
1987 involved working with "standard form" contracts, usually prepared
by the Soviets. The quality of these contracts was usually poor, but few
Westerners paid attention to contract formalities, because the Soviets had
a good reputation for meeting their commercial obligations in good faith.
An example from our experience illustrates what it was like when we first
began to confront standard Soviet forms. One of the first transactions we
handled involved a sale of substantial quantities of consumer products to
a Soviet foreign trade organization for distribution in the USSR. I sat
opposite the Soviet negotiating team, which did not include a lawyer.
Typical Soviet negotiating teams, at least in those days, limited the role
of lawyers to mere technicians. A lawyer would be summoned when the
negotiations reached a technical legal question, such as force najeure,
governing law or dispute resolution. The lawyer, more often than not,
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would simply pull out a form book and compare the clause under
negotiation to the form book clause. If the two did not match, a
bone-crushing negotiation would ensue over the text of the clause, because
usually the lawyer had no authority to agree to a variation from the form
book clause.
At the beginning of the negotiations to which I referred earlier, I
pointed out to the Soviet negotiating team that, although I did not want to
be disrespectful, the English translation of their contract in many places
did not make much sense. In addition, I explained that certain provisions
in the contract conflicted with each other. The Soviets were unfazed.
"Mr. Dean," they said, "don't you understand that we buy and sell over
two hundred million dollars of products on this form each year. Every
major company in the world signs this form, so what makes you think that
we will change it for you?" We ultimately compromised. We left the
contract intact, but added a lengthy addendum to clarify the ambiguities
and resolve the conflicts.
In January 1987, the Soviets also began to decentralize their foreign
trade apparatus, which meant that more and more Soviet organizations
would have the right to engage in foreign trade directly. Frankly, this is
not what really attracted us to open an office but, in retrospect, it has been
far more important than the Joint Venture Law. The decentralization was
significant because, previously, the state had a monopoly over foreign
trade, and all such activity was centrally controlled and administered.
Foreign trade was conducted by the former USSR Ministry of Foreign
Trade, under which there were specialized foreign trade organizations that
acted as intermediaries in buying and selling.
The Joint Venture Law, the decentralization of foreign trade and the
overall perception that the USSR was opening up to foreign business
formed the context for our consideration of the proposal to open the
Moscow office. At the time, the Soviet authorities were interested in
having a Western law firm in Moscow. Part of their interest resulted
from the belief that if Western service organizations were attracted to
Moscow, this would help the flow of capital into the Soviet Union.
However, at that time, there was really no legal basis for an organization
like ours to have an office in Moscow, except through a process known
as "accreditation." If accredited, a foreign company was entitled to open
a representative office in Moscow. However, accreditation was possible
only after a foreign company had a long and close business relationship
with the Soviet Union, which then justified having an office in the USSR.
This is very different from qualifying to do business and then commencing
operations. You had to have a track record and only then have an office.
The actual accreditation process often took as long as two years. In our
case, of course, we really had no track record, and we certainly did not
want to wait two years to open the office. Fortunately, the Soviet
authorities granted us a special dispensation and permitted us to open our
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office by subletting space from an existing foreign company. That may
seem routine, but the Soviets had never before permitted any American
company to sublet space from another organization. Under recently
adopted accreditation rules, our method of establishing an office through
an existing office has been specifically authorized, which created a clear
legal basis for our presence in Moscow.
In 1987, when we were considering the proposal, while no clients
were explicitly telling us that they wanted us to have an office in Moscow,
there was a sense that business interest was beginning to rise. One of the
great features of Coudert Brothers has been its pioneering, entrepreneurial
spirit. The firm has been committed to the delivery of high-quality legal
services to its clients throughout the world and particularly in emerging,
often difficult, foreign markets. All of these factors came together, and
the final decision was made on that rather auspicious December weekend
in 1987, just after Mr. Gorbachev had jumped out of his limousine on
Connecticut Avenue in Washington, D.C. and won the hearts and minds
of Americans. Since the Soviet authorities had taken care of all the
approvals, I literally just walked into Moscow. Initially, I was held up at
the customs check because I was bringing with me the first three months'
office supplies. However, when I showed the Custom's office clerk a
copy of the article that had appeared on the front page of Izvestiya, the
state newspaper, which announced the opening of our office, there was no
further opposition.
At first our staff consisted of just myself and a Soviet secretary with
a word processor. We added a second lawyer at the end of 1988 and a
third by the middle of 1989. The office now is staffed with four full-time
lawyers and has a fifth slot for a travelling attorney because as transaction
burdens ebb and flow we may need more support on the ground. Overall,
we have about twenty lawyers in various offices around the world,
principally in Washington, New York and Paris, from which we support
Moscow.
When we opened the office, the practice consisted of advising clients
on joint venture opportunities and other commercial transactions that
emerged from those opportunities. Gradually, as the Soviets began
authorizing more and more laws which affected foreign business, we
began doing more advisory work. Interest in joint ventures has somewhat
diminished because of the extraordinary difficulties involved in negotiating
and implementing a major investment in the USSR. Joint ventures have
turned out not to be the answer to Soviet problems.
There are two particular features of the Soviet legal system on which
I want to comment. The first is that, by and large, the system is
characterized by inaccessibility. There are a number of permutations to
this idea. The first is the inaccessibility of laws for people who need to
see them. It is a legal system that, because of the centrally-planned
economy, is largely an administrative system with tens of thousands of
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internal regulations, many of which are not published. Even if they are
published, they are done so in a limited fashion and are not generally
available. For example, when I arrived in Moscow, I made a list of laws
that I would need, by referring to legislation mentioned in the Joint
Venture Law, such as accounting rules and labor laws. The list amounted
to fifteen or sixteen items. And so I set out to find these laws. A year
later I had seven of them. It was an unbelievably frustrating experience
just to gain access to rules that were certainly relevant to our clients and
any foreign businessmen who would be involved in commercial transac-
tions in the USSR.
The best example of this inaccessibility of laws is the transaction to
which I referred earlier when I was describing the problem of dealing with
Soviet "standard form" contracts. The transaction is a complex example
of what is referred to as "compensation trade," a form of counter-trade in
which our client participated with a Soviet Ministry in an activity which
generated foreign exchange. A portion of that foreign exchange was then
allocated, on the basis of a special USSR Council of Ministers Decree, to
a Soviet foreign trade organization (in an unrelated ministry) that
purchased consumer goods from our clients.
As an aside, the reason a special decree was required was that
otherwise there would be no legal basis for what we refer to as "horizon-
tal" cooperation between two ministries. Ministries are vertically
integrated political-commercial units, which are, in fact, organs of the
Soviet government. It is a truism of East-West trade that any time a
foreign company proposes a transaction, an integral part of which requires
cooperation between ministries, the likelihood of failure is quite high.
The failure of ministries to collaborate has seriously hindered the Soviet
economy. For example, the Soviets have not produced high-quality
industrial and commercial lubricants. We worked on a project recently
that was related to the development and marketing of lubricants based on
Western technology. When the Western party met the Soviet participants
at the initial negotiations, it marked the first time that the Soviet parties,
one an automotive design enterprise under the Ministry of Automobile and
Agricultural Equipment Building, which designs automotive engines, and
an enterprise under the Ministry of Petrochemicals and Oil Refining,
which designs motor oil specifications, had ever cooperated jointly.
Returning to our "compensation trade" example and the problem of
inaccessible laws, I will never forget the day when I had to explain to our
client's general counsel the details of the transaction, including, of course,
the startling caveat that the transaction was based on a special decree that
was a state secret. The closest I had gotten to the decree was to see a
Soviet negotiator waving what he said was a copy of it from across the
table during a meeting.
Unavailable laws and secrecy are part of the problem. Of course,
dealing with the bureaucracy also presents great challenges. Before
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perestroika, you knew what you were up against when dealing with the
bureaucracy, but now there has been so much change and turmoil that it
is extremely difficult to know with whom you may be dealing, particularly
on a lower level. For example, when we first opened our office, I met a
Soviet official at the Ministry of Justice. He handed me his business card,
but everything on it except for his name had been "whited out." I asked
him what his job was. He replied that he did not really know yet. I
asked him where his office was located. He replied that he expected to
have an address in the very near future. When I asked him if he had a
phone, he answered, "No, not yet."
Dealing with the bureaucracy can involve much greater problems than
mere questions of identity and job description. We were asked by a client
to contact a senior official, a department head at the Moscow City
Council, in order to ask whether he had reviewed documents that our
client had sent to him regarding a potential real estate project. He had
provided our client with the direct phone number to his office. Those of
you who are experienced in conducting business in the Soviet Union know
that it can literally take hours to place a telephone call. The first
challenge is finding a working telephone. Next, you must have the correct
number, for it is extremely difficult to leave messages for Soviet officials.
However, even if you have the correct number, if the Soviet official
whom you are trying to contact is not in his office, frequently no one will
bother to answer the telephone. In this case, one of our secretaries placed
the telephone call and, as luck would have it, reached the official
immediately. She explained that she was calling from Coudert Brothers
and that one of our lawyers wished to speak with him. He was quite
offended that a secretary had reached him directly and replied abruptly
that he did not speak to secretaries. He went on to say that if we wanted
to speak with him, we would have to make arrangements through his
secretary. Then he hung up. Our problem was that we only had his
direct line. There are no telephone directories in Moscow, and the
challenge of finding his secretary's separate phone number was great. We
were not to be denied, however, and so we called the official back. Our
secretary, very apologetically, explained that we did not have his
secretary's phone number and asked if he could provide it. The official
requested that she hold the line a minute, left the phone and several
minutes later his secretary picked up the line. Our secretary went through
the entire story, concluding by saying that our lawyer would like to speak
with her boss. A pause ensued. Finally, she said, "He's not here" and
hung up.
The problems of finding laws and dealing with the bureaucracy pales
in comparison to the fundamental problems arising out of the Soviet
political chaos as they affect commercial transactions. The ongoing debate
and struggle among the Central authorities, the republic-level authorities
and the local authorities over political and economic rights has severely
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hampered foreign investment. The best example of this is what has come
to be known as the "DeBeers problem." Some months ago, DeBeers, the
South African diamond producer, announced that it had entered into a
contract with the Soviet Union, pursuant to which it had been appointed
the exclusive world-wide distributorship of Soviet diamonds.2 DeBeers
had agreed to pay the Soviets millions of dollars in advance for such
exclusive rights.3 At the time, the transaction seemed best explained by
the growing shortages the Soviets were facing in foreign exchange.4
However, several weeks after the transaction was announced, to every-
one's surprise, Boris Yeltsin, who only recently had become head of the
Russian republic, announced that, since no Russian republic-level officials
were involved in negotiating and signing a contract covering diamonds,
which were located in the Russian republic, the contract was void.5
Several weeks later, the local authorities in Yakutia, the region in which
the diamond mines were actually located within the Russian republic,
announced that they did not care what Mr. Gorbachev had negotiated or
what Mr. Yeltsin had renounced, but that, since the diamonds were
located in Yakutia, no contract could be signed for their distribution
without local approval.' Therefore, we find ourselves in situations where
frequently we must advise clients to obtain approvals at all three levels in
order to be sure that their project can proceed. However, the reality of
this process is that few, if any, foreign companies have been able to obtain
such approvals at these levels. The result has been a dramatic slowdown
in natural resource projects in the Soviet Union.
Our job has also been made more complicated by the fact that amidst
the political, social and economic chaos of today's Soviet Union, we are
witnessing an "explosion" of laws. When we first opened our office in
1988, a foreign lawyer operating in the Soviet Union did not need to know
much Soviet law in order to advise Western clients. Of course, it was
necessary that he possess some familiarity with the Joint Venture Law and
certain other aspects of Soviet law, such as labor laws and tax laws.
However, generally, foreigners had very little contact with the Soviet legal
system. Routinely, foreign trade contracts were governed by laws other
than Soviet law (usually Swedish law), and disputes were resolved by
arbitration at a neutral site (usually Stockholm). While Swedish law and
Stockholm arbitration continue to remain popular choices in East-West
2. Timberlake, DeBeers Signs Diamond Pact with Soviets, Chicago Tribune, July 26,
1990, at CI, col. 1.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See Bohlen, Soviet Zone Strives for Sovereignty and Diamonds, N.Y. Times, Aug.
15, 1990, at A3, col. 3.
6. Id.
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contracts, Soviet law has been developing very rapidly. A number of real
estate laws, such as laws on property, on land and on leasing, as well as
a completely reconstituted corporate and individual taxation system, have
been passed by the newly constituted USSR Supreme Soviet. New laws
covering patents, environmental protection, antitrust and foreign invest-
ment are all under contemplation.
The final area of concern in completing commercial transactions in the
Soviet Union, which I would like to address, relates to the general
category of "performance problems." Many of you are familiar with the
payment problems the Soviets have been confronting over the last six
months. It is difficult to overstate the significance of these problems.
Our perspective in rendering advice to our clients is to attempt to explain
to them how difficult it is to complete a transaction in the Soviet Union.
We are not in the business of "selling" the Soviet marketplace. We try
to be realistic and thoroughly explain to clients the risks and benefits of
proceeding with their proposed projects. Prior to the payment problems,
when I would make such presentations to business people experienced in
Soviet transactions, they would frequently reply: "We understand the
problems, but we have been doing business in the Soviet Union for a long
time and we know that no matter how difficult it may be to negotiate the
contract and no matter how bad the contract form itself may be, the
Soviets always pay and they pay on time." That was true-up until the
end of 1989. The Soviets are now suffering from a dramatic cash-flow
problem. It may not be too much of an exaggeration to suggest that the
Soviet economy, from a foreign exchange point of view, is insolvent in
the sense that Soviet organizations have been unable to meet their
obligations, at least in the foreign trade area, as they have fallen due.
This cash-flow problem is perhaps the first dramatic consequence of the
government's policy of decentralization in the foreign trade sector.
Certainly the impression, which has been created, is that "things are out
of control." Soviet organizations are blaming the Bank for Foreign
Economic Relations for failing to advance the funds so that they can honor
their contractual commitments. The bank has asserted that the fault lies
with the Soviet organizations who have over-extended themselves. At this
point, estimates of the trade debt are about $3.5 billion, and there has
been no clear mechanism developed under which foreign companies owed
substantial sums are being paid except to appeal to high-level state officials
for payment.
There are certainly positive signs on which to focus. At this point,
Mr. Gorbachev has largely removed fear as the primary motive for
decision-making in the Soviet Union. He has also begun a process that
has promoted greater "truth telling" in the USSR. Perhaps, for these
accomplishments alone, he deserves to win the Nobel Prize. There is
some indication that the Soviets are reaching the conclusion that their
centrally planned, command economic structure is an utter failure. How
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quickly they can move from that position of failure to a more market-
oriented economy remains to be seen. It is not yet clear that they are on
a path that will lead to significant economic reform, but there is a growing
consensus that dramatic reforms will be necessary. Most analysts agree
that the question for the Soviet Union is "when," not "if." That in itself
may be an overly optimistic assessment, but one hopes that over the
course of the next several years and decades the Soviet Union may begin
to make progress toward substantial economic, political and social
reforms, which will lead not only to its becoming a more stable trade
partner but a more stable political partner in an increasingly interdepen-
dent and complex world.
Thank you very much.
